Growth and Distribution in Low Income Economies: Modifying Post Keynesian Analysis in Light of Theory and History by Razmi, Arslan
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Economics Department Working Paper Series Economics
2015
Growth and Distribution in Low Income
Economies: Modifying Post Keynesian Analysis in
Light of Theory and History
Arslan Razmi
University of Massachusetts - Amherst, arazmi@econs.umass.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/econ_workingpaper
Part of the Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Economics Department Working Paper Series by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please
contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Razmi, Arslan, "Growth and Distribution in Low Income Economies: Modifying Post Keynesian Analysis in Light of Theory and
History" (2015). Economics Department Working Paper Series. 181.
Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umass.edu/econ_workingpaper/181
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
 
 
 
Working Paper 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
AMHERST 
Growth and Distribution in Low 
Income Economies: Modifying 
Post Keynesian Analysis in Light 
of Theory and History 
 
by 
 
Razmi, Arslan 
 
 
Working Paper 2015-16 
Growth and Distribution in Low Income
Economies: Modifying Post Keynesian Analysis
in Light of Theory and History
Arslan Razmi
September 10, 2015
Abstract
Growth in low-income developing economies with large sectors charac-
terized by underemployment is unlikely to be wage-led in the traditional
neo-Kaleckian sense of the term. Output and employment in the sectors
of the economy producing non-tradable output could be demand-led, how-
ever, and policies directly aimed at more equitable distribution in these
sectors could boost long-run growth. Some of the fast growing Asian
economies may have been examples of wage-led growth in this rather
di¤erent sense of the term. Over time, re-distributive measures in the
traditional sector, such as land reforms, could lead to faster wage and
output growth across the economy.
JEL classi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1 Introduction and Background
With rising inequality and slowing growth across signicant parts of the industri-
alized world, the relationship between income distribution and growth appears
to be making a comeback as an issue of macroeconomic concern. Researchers
working in the Post Keynesian tradition have analyzed this issue actively in
recent decades, thanks in large part to a focus on the role of aggregate demand
as the main determinant of economic growth. While most of the models be-
ginning with Steindl (1952), and including, among others, Del Monte (1975),
Taylor (1983), and Dutt (1984), had a strong stagnationist tilt, Blecker (1989)
and Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) raised the possibility of exhilarationismor
prot-led demand. Although a detailed discussion of these debates is beyond
the scope of this paper,1 it would be useful to re-visit the grounds on which
these latter papers extended the neo-Kaleckian framework to make prot-led
growth or exhilarationism possible.
Blecker (1989) analyzed the implications of opening up the economy to trade
in goods using an imperfect substitutesframework whereby the domestically
produced good is assumed to be an imperfect substitute for the foreign-made
good. Price behavior is modelled as a exible mark-up factor over average vari-
able costs. Any increase in the real wage resulting from a redistribution is
partially or fully passed through to the export price, making domestic goods
less competitive internationally. This counters any positive e¤ects on growth
through increased utilization and investment. Thus, if the Marshall-Lerner
(ML) condition is satised,2 room for stagnationism and wage-led growth nar-
rows.3 Even an economy that is wage-led in the absence of international trade
can therefore turn into a into a prot-led one if a decline in real wages boosts
international demand adequately to o¤set the fall in domestic absorption.
Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) challenged the traditional neo-Kaleckian invest-
ment function on the grounds that the separate inclusion of the prot rate and
capacity utilization creates a strong accelerator e¤ect. The authors o¤ered
an alternative specication involving the prot share as an argument instead
of the prot rate. An economy, with this modication, can be stagnationist,
in the sense that a redistribution towards wages boosts consumption demand
su¢ ciently to boost aggregate demand and utilization, or it can be exhilara-
tionist, whereby such redistribution reduces investment demand su¢ ciently to
lower aggregate demand and utilization. If the redistribution-induced increase
in demand is strong enough, utilization rises adequately to dominate the neg-
ative direct e¤ect of a lower prot share on investment. Wage-led capital
accumulation and growth result. Conversely, growth is prot-led.
Most of the literature arising from these neo-Kaleckian models has centered
1Blecker (2002) provides a detailed overview of these theoretical developments.
2The ML condition can be stated as follows: assuming initially balanced trade and innite
price elasticities of export and import supplies, a devaluation improves the trade balance if
and only if the import and export price demand elasticities sum to greater than one.
3Note that these results follow in the particular case where an increase in international
competitiveness occurs through wage suppression. An alternative kind of re-distribution that
takes the form of a decline in the mark-up over costs generates di¤erent results.
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around advanced country considerations. This applies to both theory and,
perhaps not surprisingly considering data limitations, empirical studies.4 Sev-
eral considerations suggest that the standard neo-Kaleckian framework may be
inadequate once one turns to the macroeconomic relationship between dis-
tribution, demand, and growth in low-income developing economies. First,
these economies tend to su¤er from shortages of production capacity, specif-
ically capital. In the words of Kalecki (1976)(p. 17), [U]nemployment and
underemployment in underdeveloped countries are of an entirely di¤erent na-
ture. They result from the shortage of capital equipment rather than from a
deciency of e¤ective demand.This has been widely recognized in the struc-
turalist literature of past decades. Taylor (1983)(chapter 10), for example, posits
a demand-constrained North and a capital-constrained South.5
Second, the imperfect substitutes framework may not be the appropriate
one for many economically small open developing economies that produce rela-
tively unsophisticated goods, and face many competitors in world markets. For
example, it is hard to justify analyzing as imperfect substitutes the everyday
garments exported by a number of developing countries. World demand for the
typical developing countrys manufactured exports is likely to be extremely elas-
tic, as is the world supply curve for its imports. Given the economically small
presence of the typical developing country in international markets, price-taking
behavior may be a good approximation for most of the tradable sector.6
This segues into a third crucial issue. Low income economies are often
characterized by dual labor and goods market structures. To put it in rather
simplistic terms perhaps, a relatively modern capitalist sector coexists with
varying degrees of comfort alongside a traditional, informal sector. Most in-
dustrial goods produced in the relatively modern sector are tradable across
international borders. Traditional services and small-scale agriculture are ren-
dered non-tradable by transportation costs and trade barriers. Thus, roughly
speaking, one could employ the modern industrial/manufactured goods as a
proxy for tradable production while other goods and services could roughly be
classied under the non-traded category.
Does the fact that developing countries are typically capital-constrained un-
dermine the relevance of models with less-than-full resource employment? Here
another typical feature of low income economies becomes relevant. As pointed
out by Lewis (1954) among others, such economies are often characterized by
4Of the studies that do include developing countries, Onaran and Galanis (2012) nd that
Turkey and South Korea are wage-led while Argentina, Mexico, China, India, and South
Africa are prot-led. Simarro (2011) conclude, based on their empirical estimates, that for
the period 1978-2007, Chinese growth was prot-led. Wang (2009) reached similar conclusions
for China for the period 1993-2007. The study also found that that while the expansion
of interregional and international trade plays an important role, it is investment expenditure
that determines the prot-led pattern of economic growth.
5See also Blecker (1996) and Dutt (2002) for specications that similarly emphasize this
di¤erence between developed and low income economies.
6 It is pertinent to point out here that what applies to an individual country may not
apply to a group of countries. Thus, the developing countries as a whole may inuence
international prices even if individual countries are price takers. See Razmi and Blecker
(2008) for an exploration of the fallacy of composition issue.
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underemployment, especially in the traditional/rural sector. Modern sector jobs
are at a premium, but given their scarcity and the lack of an employment in-
surance system, work sharing in the rural sector acts as the fallback position.
While capital is fully employed, other resources are not. Indeed, the movement
of underemployed labor from the rural/traditional sector to higher productivity
sectors remains the main development challenge for many low-income economies.
Finally, developing countries often have problems attracting foreign savings
to nance current account decits. Moreover, with very few exceptions, most of
these countries have a hard time borrowing on international markets in domestic
currency. These problems are amplied by the fact that the capital goods
required by low-income countries are mostly imported. The implication is that
the typical developing country faces external constraints that limit the size of
current account imbalances that it can sustain. An important adjustment
mechanism in response to external imbalances is the real exchange rate, i.e., the
price of tradables relative to non-tradables. Even if demand and output is wage-
led in the short-run, an economy may run into the external account constraint
over time, and how this relative price evolves, either endogenously or under the
guiding hand of policy, inuences the trajectories of wages and growth.
These factors call for a re-assessment of the framework employed to investi-
gate the relationship between distribution and growth in developing economies.
If capital scarcity rather than the degree of capacity utilization is the main
issue, then the specication of investment equations (including the Marglin-
Bhaduri critique) must be re-evaluated. If price-taking behavior dominates in
the tradable sector, then the framework employed by Blecker (1989) and later
studies must be re-visited. Razmi (2015) addressed these issues in a stagnation-
ist/exhilarationist context. That paper employed two di¤erent versions of the
traditional dependent economy framework with tradable and non-tradable sec-
tors: (i) a two-sector framework with traded and non-traded goods, and (ii) a
three-sector framework with a non-traded good and two traded goods. The
latter, more general, framework incorporates a price-taking tradable goods-
producing sector and another sector that produces goods that are imperfect
substitutes for goods created by the rest of the world. The main conclusion was
that the presence of a price taking tradable goods-producing sector leaves little
scope for wage-led growth in the traditional neo-Kaleckian sense of the term.
The present paper uses a framework similar to the two-sector one in Razmi
(2015). However, given the purpose of this paper, the wage behavior is mod-
ied and worker savings incorporated to analyze and compare the e¤ects of
income re-distribution in the two sectors. This allows us to investigate the
consequences of policies such as land reforms, and to briey discuss implica-
tions from a historical perspective. Moreover, the behavior of the economy
in response to re-distributive shocks over time is studied in much more detail.
While wage-led growth in the traditional sense may not be feasible, there are
other re-distributive policies that could promote growth through increases in
worker incomes, as long as supplementary policies ensure a smooth path of real
exchange rate adjustment to avoid prolonged external imbalances.
3
2 Theoretical Framework
The theoretical model in this paper is largely based on Razmi (2015), modied
to allow a more in-depth exploration of key issues. The overall framework is
that of the dependent economymodel with a traded goods sector (or T -sector)
and a non-traded goods one (or N -sector).7 Table 1 provides a summarized
description of the variables employed.
The economy under consideration is characterized by underemployment in
the rural/traditional/non-tradable sector. The output of this sector (YN ) is
not traded on international markets due to various barriers such as quality
standards, transaction barriers, transportation costs, and lack of infrastructure.
Production requires a xed factor (land), and labor (LN ), which earns an ef-
fectivereal wage !N in terms of the non-tradable good. Labor gets a constant
proportion  of its marginal contribution that is determined by norms, institu-
tions, etc. The rents are captured by the owners of the xed factor (i.e., the
landlords), whose share in output is denoted by R. To summarize:
YN = AL

N ;   1 (1)
!N = AL
 1
N (2)
R = 1   (3)
where A is a technological constant and the parameter  ( 1) captures the
presence of diminishing returns in this sector.8
Developing economies with underemployment are characterized often by
work sharing in the absence of public unemployment insurance coverage. An
alternative measure of non-traded sector worker income, therefore, takes the
empirically measured wage in the traditional sector as an average remunera-
tion, that is, total labor income divided by the number of workers not employed
in the formal sector. This sharing wage(!N ) is given by
!N =
!NLN
L  LT  !N (4)
where LT is employment in the tradable sector, while L is the total size of the
labor force.9 Depending on institutional and social characteristics, the measured
7See Swan (1960) for an early exposition.
8 It is important to note here that none of the later results regarding steady state accumu-
lation and growth depend on this assumption of diminishing returns, although modifying it
will a¤ect the real wage and distribution in the non-tradable sector. The product  must be
less than one to ensure a positive share of rents.
9The total labor force includes the sum of employment in the two sectors as well as the
unemployed. It is widely recognized that the terms unemployment and/or underemploy-
ment are much less well-dened in a low-income economy context. Many workers who are
unable to nd a job in the modern sector may either remain unemployed, or work in the non-
tradable sector, often sharing work with family members. These features were highlighted in
the seminal contribution of Lewis (1954).
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wage in the traditional, non-tradable sector may fall anywhere between the
sharing wage !N and the e¤ective wage !N :
The modern sector of the economy, the tradable sector or T -sector, produces
internationally tradable output using labor (LT ) and an accumulable factor of
production (capital), K, in xed proportions. In line with traditional struc-
turalist models for the South, the output of the sector is capital constrained.
YT = min

LT
a
;
K
b

(5)
where a and b are technologically determined constants, which for simplicity
we will assume to equal unity (i.e., a = b = 1). The price of the tradable
good, PT , is internationally given. Workers have some bargaining power in the
T -sector, and the real wage !T is assumed to be proportional to a benchmark
level of worker purchasing power in terms of non-tradables, !T . It may be more
intuitive to think of the real wage being negotiated in terms of both goods in the
expenditure basket, but since the price of tradables is given, this is an innocuous
simplication within the scope of our analysis. The exogenously given factor of
proportionality  captures labor market conditions, institutions, principal-agent
problems (e¢ ciency wages) and bargaining in the presence of costly search and
relationship-specic investment.10 Specically,
!T = !T ;  > 0 (6)
Denoting the real exchange rate (the relative price of tradables in terms of
non-tradables) by q, the prot share of tradable output  is then given by:
 =
ePTYT  WTLT
ePTYT
= 1  !T
q
= 1  !T
q
(7)
In line with standard structuralist and neo-Kaleckian literature, capitalists
and landlords are assumed to save a constant proportion s of their income.
Workers, on the other hand, save a smaller fraction sw ( s) of their wage
income. There is no government spending or taxation.
Consumer preferences reect an underlying Cobb-Douglas utility function,
tradables and non-tradables are substitutes in consumption, and the consump-
tion of non-tradables CN equals a proportion  of total capitalist, landlord, and
worker consumption:
10This specication is di¤erent from that employed by Razmi (2015), in that the real product
wage was assumed xed there. The modication is useful here since, rather than carrying
out thought experiments involving an exogenous increase in the nominal wage in the tradable
sector, we are interested here in non-traditional forms of wage-led growth.
One could also introduce e¢ ciency wage and fallback wage considerations, as in Razmi
et al. (2012). Tradable-sector employment rate LT =L is the key determinant here of workers
fallback position. The smaller the pool of available labor outside the tradable sector, the
greater the bargaining power of workers. Another plausible argument for inclusion in the
-function is the sharing wage !N , which too would reect the fallback position of workers.
The inclusion of this variable would signicantly complicate the algebra here. However, I will
come back to these issues while qualifying the implications of the analysis in Section 3.3.
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Table 1: Denitions of key variables
Variable Denition
Ci, Yi Consumption and output of good i, respectively (i = N , T )
T;R Total rents and rental share of income in the non-tradable sector
, r, r Prot share of output and the domestic and world prot rates
!i Real wage in terms of non-tradables in sector i
 Worker share of marginal product in N -sector
!N Shared wage in the N -sector
Ii Investment
K Stock of capital
Li Employment in sector i
TB Trade balance
sw, s Worker and capitalist saving rates
e, q Nominal and real exchange rates
Pi Price of good i
 Share of domestic consumption expenditure devoted to non-tradables
CN =  [(1  sw) (!NLN + !TLT ) + (1  s) (RALN + qK)]
and,
 = (q); q0 > 0 (8)
The rst half of the expression in the square brackets on the right hand side
captures consumption by workers, while the second half represents consumption
by landlords and owners of capital. Employing eqs. (1), (2), (3), (5), (6), and
(7) allows us to consolidate the above expression, so that
CN =  f[(1  s) + (s   sw)]ALN + [(1  s)q + (s   sw)!T ]Kg (9)
A similar expression can be derived for domestic consumption of the tradable
good:
CT = (1 )

[(1  s) + (s   sw)] AL

N
q
+

(1  s) + (s   sw) !T
q

K

(10)
Finally, lets turn to investment behavior. With a capital constraint, the
degree of capacity utilization is no longer a driver of protability, so that the
Marglin-Bhaduri critique does not come into play. Second, as mentioned in
Section 3.3, the typical developing country imports a high proportion of its
capital goods so that structuralist literature often simplies by assuming that
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all capital goods are imported. Third, the typical developing economy is likely
to be a price-taker in the international market for capital goods. One can,
therefore, simplify by assuming that the price of capital goods, PK , equals
that of the other tradable goods. The prot rate r is, under these conditions,
interchangeable with the prot share. Investment (I) behavior can, therefore,
be specied as follows:
I
K
= f(r   r) = f

ePTYT  WTLT
ePKK
  r

= f

ePTK  WTK
ePKK
  r

= f

1   !T
q
  r

; f 0 > 0 (11)
where r captures a target benchmark prot rate, or alternatively, the returns
to investing abroad, which can be taken as exogenously determined for a small
nancially open economy. The tradable good can, of course, be exported or
consumed domestically. While, as discussed earlier, it is reasonable to assume
balanced trade over the long-run, there are likely to be short-run deviations. The
trade balance (TB), expressed in terms of tradables, soaks up any di¤erences
between income and expenditure in this time frame.
TB
K
=
YT
K
  CT
K
  I
K
(12)
where the trade balance is normalized by the capital stock for convenience. Eqs.
(1)-(12), which contain 13 endogenous variables (YN , LN , !N , !N , CN , R, YT ,
CT , !T , , , TB, I=K), complete the framework for our short-run analysis.
As discussed below, equation (12) is the T -sector equilibrium condition. The
real exchange rate q and the level of capital stock k are pre-determined in the
short run. We turn to their behavior shortly One more equilibrium condition is
needed to round o¤ our short-run analysis, that for non-tradable market clear-
ing. Given the satisfaction of these conditions, the macroeconomic equilibrium
condition is satised by Walrass Law.11
By denition, the equilibrium condition for non-tradables is given by
YN = CN (13)
11Recall that there are three underlying equilibrium conditions: N -sector clearing, T -sector
clearing, and macroeconomic equilibrium, respectively.
YN = CN (A)
YT = CT + TB + I (B)
Y = YN + qYT = CN + qCT + qI + qTB (C)
Imposing N -sector clearing on equation (C) yields:
YT = CT + I + TB
which leads to the trade balance condition. With N -sector clearing, the satisfaction of any
one of the two equations (B) and (C) ensures satisfaction of the other.
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Substituting from eqs. (1) and (9), yields, after some manipulation:
LN =

 [(1  s)q + (s   sw)!T ]
1   [(1  s) + (s   sw)]
K
A
 1

(14)
Output at any instant is determined by the amount of employment which
is in turn ultimately determined by demand from the tradable sector. The
distributional variables !T and R are determined by exogenous variables. The
real exchange rate is given in the short run, as is the capital stock. Employment
in the non-tradable sector varies to maintain equilibrium. An expansion of the
tradable sector (a rise in K), a shift in demand towards non-tradables (a rise
in ) or a decline in either saving rate expands employment in the non-tradable
sector. Redistribution of income towards workers in either sector  that is, a
rise in !T or  too expands non-tradable employment, as long as s  sw > 0.
The detailed expressions for these and later comparative statics are presented
in the Appendix (see eqs. (A1), (A6), and (A11) in particular). In brief, short-
run equilibrium in the non-tradable sector presents a picture consistent with
wage-led output growth.
Once LN has been pinned down, N -sector output and wages can be deter-
mined using eqs. (1), (2), (4), and (14).
CN = YN =
 [(1  s)q + (s   sw)!T ]
1   [(1  s) + (s   sw)]K (15)
!N = A

(1  s)q + (s   sw)!T
1   [(1  s) + (s   sw)]
K
A
  1

(16)
!N =
1
L  LT 

(1  s)q + (s   sw)!T
1   [(1  s) + (s   sw)]K

(17)
We can also now derive an expression for total rents accruing to the landlords
in terms of the non-tradables,
T = RYN = (1  )YN
= 
 [(1  s)q + (s   sw)!T ]
1   [(1  s) + (s   sw)]K (18)
Non-tradable output and the sharing wage are increasing in K, q, and 
and declining in s, and sW (eqs. (15)), and (17). Changes in these variables
have the opposite impact on the e¤ective N -sector real wage in the presence
of diminishing returns (i.e.,as long as  < 1 in equation (16)). Intuitively, a
real depreciation (a rise in q) causes increased spending on non-tradables, due
to both income and substitution e¤ects. Since output and employment in the
N -sector are demand-led, these move upward, as does the sharing wage. Lower
saving by either group has the same impact, as does, a higher tradable sector
real wage (as long as s > sw) . Due to diminishing returns, however, higher
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employment corresponds to a lower real e¤ective wage. Increased employment
in the modern tradable sector raises the shared wage but leaves the e¤ective
real wage una¤ected. The former e¤ect follows from the fact that more income
is being distributed among fewer people outside the T -sector.
Finally, re-distribution towards wages in the N -sector (an increase in ),
the basis for an important thought experiment in Section 3.2, raises both the
e¤ective real wage and the shared wage in the N -sector. Indeed, this is the
only comparative static amongst the ones discussed that results in a rise in both
wages. Given that such a re-distribution raises spending on non-tradables, the
rise in the sharing wage is not surprising. That the real wage rises too is
a consequence of the fact that while the marginal product of labor declines,
workersshare of each unit of output rises, and the latter e¤ect dominates.
Domestic consumption of the tradable good can be derived from eqs. (10)
and (14).
CT = (1  )
(1  s) + (s   sw) !Tq
1   [(1  s) + (s   sw)]K (19)
Thus, substituting from equations (5), (11), (14) and (19), yields the follow-
ing expression for the trade balance, i.e., the T -sector equilibrium condition:
TB
K
= 1  (1  )
(1  s) + (s   sw) !Tq
1   [(1  s) + (s   sw)]   f

1   !T
q
  r

(20)
An increase in the saving rate of either group has the e¤ect of reducing do-
mestic consumption and thereby generating a trade surplus. A rise in the labor
share of output in the N -sector has the opposite e¤ect. A real appreciation (i.e.,
a decline in q) or an increased real wage in the T -sector have ambiguous e¤ects on
the trade balance. Consumption of tradables rises on the one hand while invest-
ment declines on the other. Intuitively, a real appreciation makes non-tradables
relatively expensive, reducing domestic expenditure on them (both through in-
come and substitution e¤ects). This would negatively a¤ect the trade balance.
Tradable sector protability declines, however, and this would tend to gener-
ate a trade surplus. Stability of the long-run system requires the satisfaction of
the famous Marshall-Lerner-Bickerdike-Robinson (MLRB) condition so that the
spending e¤ect dominates the investment e¤ect and @TB=@q > 0. A signicant
body of literature nds that this condition is satised.12
To summarize, our short-run set-up has two equilibrium conditions, one for
each sector. Employment in the N -sector, which is demand driven, and the
trade balance adjust to ensure market-clearing.
A Longer-Run View
12See, for example, Bahmani-Oskoee and Niroomand (1998) for a test of the Marshall-Lerner
condition for a large sample of countries. Note that the MLRB condition is less stringent
than the ML condition since it does not assume innite export and import supply elasticities.
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In addition to immediate e¤ects, we are also interested in changes over time,
especially the e¤ects of re-distribution on growth over a period of time. A
note of caution is in order, however, before we proceed. The terms long-
run and steady state as employed in this and subsequent sections refer to
periods of logical time long enough so that the variables of interest grow at a
constant (exponential) rate. With diminishing returns to labor in the N -sector
( < 1), however, there can be no steady state growth in the very long-run, and
stationary state scenarios emerge. Our analysis beyond the short run is limited
to a low-income economy for as long as it has a pool of underemployed workers,
so that output and employment growth are endogenous. Wherever applicable,
I will refer to this period of analysis as the "longer-run.
Suppose that the developing economy under consideration is limited by the
availability of capital ows to a trade balance TB=K over the longer run. This
could be zero or, more generally, a non-zero constant. The real exchange rate
adjusts in order to satisfy this constraint over time. Using a carat or hatto
denote the rate of growth allows us to describe the adjustment mechanism as
follows:
q^ = h

TB
K
  TB
K

; h0 > 0 (21)
The longer-run set-up thus involves q as a state variable, which adjusts
over time to maintain the trade balance. Given the satisfaction of the MLRB
condition, @q^=@q < 0. This is graphically captured by Figure 1 in (q, q^) space.
A real depreciation creates a trade surplus. The path of q between the steady
states must therefore be downward sloping (i.e., the real exchange rate must
appreciate over time along the adjustment path).
A shock to any of the variables that appear in equation (20), such as s,
R, or !T translates into a new steady state corresponding with a new level of
the real exchange rate. Given our focus on distributional considerations, I will
focus on the latter two shocks. First, however, lets explore the steady state
properties of the system.
In the steady state, the real exchange rate is constant, trade is balanced and
the economy is growing at a constant rate. In addition, the steady state is
characterized by:
L^N = C^N = C^T = Y^N = Y^T = K^ (22)
In other words, the growth rates of sectoral output, consumption, and capital
stock growth are identical. This is not surprising given the balanced trade
constraint in the steady state. To see why, consider that q is constant in the
steady state, as are !T , and, from equation (8), , and, therefore, from equation
(20), TB. Since the saving rates and N -sector distributional parameters are
exogenous, equation (11), (14), and (19) imply after log-di¤erentiation that:
L^N =
1

K^, C^T = K^ =
I
K
(23)
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Log-di¤erentiating equation (9) and substituting for L^N from equation (23)
yields,
C^N = K^ (24)
To sum up again, relative prices are rigid in the short-run and LN adjusts
in response to excess demand or supply in the non-tradable sector, which is
demand-led. The trade balance TB adjusts in response to tradable sector
disequilibria. Relative prices adjust over time in response to trade imbalances.
What are the prospects for wage-led growth in this stylized economy? This
is the question to which we now turn.
Figure 1: The dynamics of the long-run set-up.
3 Distribution and Growth
We are now in a position to compare the e¤ects of redistribution in the two
sectors. We will start with the tradable sector and then move to the non-
tradable one. In the process, we will notice some interesting di¤erences emerge,
both in the short run and over time.
3.1 Raising the real wage of T -sector workers
First, consider the consequences of wage-led growth in the traditional sense of
the term, i.e., through an increase in the modern sector wage, either through a
rise in the benchmark wage !T via an upward nominal movement, or a rise in
11
. Equations (14) and (15) make it clear that re-distribution towards the group
with a lower propensity to save expands output and employment in the non-
tradable sector. Higher employment means a lower e¤ective real wage in the
N -sector, thanks to diminishing returns (equation (16)). However, equation
(17) tells us that the extra output generated translates into a higher sharing
wage. Thus, average living standards for workers rise in both sectors in the
short run. On the external front, the immediate result of the re-distribution
away from savers is to boost the consumption of tradables, and therefore, based
on equation (20), to create a trade decit. This means that the system jumps
from a point like A in Figure 1, where q^ = 0 to a point such as B where q^ > 0.
Over time, the excess demand for tradables, manifested by the trade decit,
leads to relative price movement via equation (21). This is captured by the real
depreciation shown in the movement from point B to point C in Figure (1). A
higher (depreciated) real exchange rate is now consistent with the new steady
state. This higher real exchange rate gives a further boost to spending on the
non-tradable good, both due to income and substitution e¤ects. The end result
is higher output and sharing real wage in the N -sector.
How is the steady state level of growth in the modern sector and hence in
the traditional sector a¤ected? Here a look at equation (11) is required. Recall
that the initial increase in the real wage leads eventually to a depreciated real
exchange rate. The e¤ect on the steady state rate of accumulation, therefore,
depends on which variable increases more in proportional terms. In other words,
is the rise in q su¢ cient to more than o¤set the initial rise in !T , leaving us with
a lower steady state real wage and a higher rate of accumulation? The following
mathematical expression for the proportional change in the steady state value
of !T =~q, based on eqs. (20) and (21), shows that this is not the case.
!T
~q
d~q
d!T

q^=0
=
(1  )S   f 0 [1   (B + S)]
(1  )S + 0

B + S !Tq
 h
1 (B+S)
1 (B+S)
i
q
!T
  f 0 [1   (B + S)]
where a ~ over a variable denotes its steady state value, B = 1   s and
S = s   sw. The expression above simplies to the following condition:
!T
~q
d~q
d!T

q^=0
> 1 i¤ 0

B + S
!T
q

[1   (B + S)] q
!T
6 0
which is not satised as long as tradables and non-tradables are substitutes in
consumption. Thus, !T~q
d~q
d!T

q^=0
< 1. Intuitively, a look at equation (20)
reveals that the real exchange rate inuences the trade balance through a wider
variety of channels than the T -sector real wage.13 A smaller increase in the
13One way to see this directly is to consider the case where s   sw = 0, i.e., there is no
saving rate di¤erential between the two classes. A rise in the T -sector real wage in this case
no longer has an e¤ect on the trade balance while a change in q still does, thanks to income
and substitution e¤ects.
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steady state value of q, therefore, su¢ ces to correct the trade imbalance created
by income re-distribution. This means that the real T -sector wage is higher,
and accumulation lower, in the new steady state.
In sum, the benets of re-distribution for T -sector workers in our framework
spill over to workers outside this sector in the form of a higher sharing wage 
through the aggregate demand channel. This may not be a sustainable growth
strategy however, given that the steady state rate of accumulation declines.14
In terms of the political economic repercussions, the main distributional conict
is between capitalists on the one hand, and workers and landlords on the other.
3.2 A change in distributional norms in the N-sector
Now consider how an increase in the worker share of N -sector income, i.e., a rise
in  plays out. Again, re-distribution towards spenders helps raiseN -sector out-
put through the demand channel. Unlike the redistribution previously analyzed,
the sharing real wage and the e¤ective real wage both rise in the short-run, the
direct e¤ect of the redistribution dominating the e¤ect of diminishing marginal
product in the latter case. Landlords su¤er because, although the output of
non-tradables rises, their share per unit of output has declined, and, as shown
in the appendix, this latter e¤ect dominates (see equation (A9)). This boon
to N -sector workers spills over to capitalists in the T -sector, without hurting
workers, as the real exchange rate depreciates over time in response to the
trade decit created. This means also that the initial boost to N -sector worker
incomes gets magnied over time thanks to expenditure-switching towards non-
tradables. The change in the steady state level of the real exchange rate is
positive, as shown by the following expression:
d~q
d

q^=0
=
(1  )

B + S !Tq

S
1 (B+S)
(1  )S !Tq2 + 0

B + S !Tq
 h
1 (B+S)
1 (B+S)
i
  f 0 [1   (B + S)] !Tq2
In terms of Figure 1, the analysis is quite similar to that provided in the pre-
vious sub-section, with the real exchange rate beginning its depreciation follow-
ing the trade decit created by the initial shock, and continuously depreciating
towards a new higher steady state level.
How are T -sector workers and capitalists a¤ected? The real wage is rigid
in terms of non-tradables, so that the nominal wage follows the price of non-
tradables down. Put di¤erently, the real wage falls in terms of tradables. This
means that protability improves. Unlike the earlier case where income was
initially re-distributed to T -sector workers, the steady state rate of accumulation
gets a boost. Unlike that case, the main distributional conict is now between
14Notice that the negative e¤ect on steady state accumulation would be even greater if the
T -sector real wage were rigid in terms of the tradable good, as in Razmi (2015), since in this
case the resulting real depreciation will not mitigate the e¤ects on investment through a lower
T -sector nominal wage.
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Table 2: Summary of e¤ects on di¤erent groups or variables
Experiment !N !N T LN !T I=K
" !T or "  Short-run   + + + +  
Steady state   + + + +  
"  Short-run + +   + 0 0
Steady state +=  + +=  + 0 +
capitalists and workers on the one hand, and landlords on the other. Opposition
to re-distribution lacks a constituency in the modern/urban sector in this case.
To sum up, the two kinds of re-distribution discussed here have contrary
e¤ects insofar as their consequences for steady state capital accumulation are
concerned. Moreover, the e¤ects on functional classes are not identical. Table 2
summarizes this discussion for convenience. From the perspective of a capital-
constrained low-income economy, the implications for development are likely to
be quite important over time.
3.3 Alternative specications of T -sector wage behavior
Before we explore wage-led growth further from a development perspective, lets
briey examine the e¤ects of specifying di¤erent labor market behavior in the
modern sector. Suppose the T -sector wage is negotiated in terms of tradable
goods rather than non-tradable ones. Re-distribution towards T -sector workers
in this case would have the same enhancing e¤ects on incomes outside the T -
sector for similar demand-driven reasons but will lower the steady state rate
of capital accumulation and output growth even more. This is because in this
case the resulting real depreciation will not mitigate the e¤ects on investment
through a lower T -sector nominal wage.
What about our second thought experiment involving re-distribution in the
N -sector? Again, the resulting increase in demand and real depreciation will
benet N -sector workers and, thanks to their increased purchasing power in
terms of non-tradables, T -sector workers. The steady state level of investment,
however, is no longer positively inuenced. Indeed, it is unchanged. Thus, the
positive e¤ect of N -sector redistribution on steady state investment does not
survive this change in specication. However, as development literature going
back to Ricardo (1821) has recognized, workers mostly consume necessities,
which in low-income economies mainly consist of non-tradables. Specifying real
wages as negotiated in terms of non-tradables is a reasonable rst approxima-
tion. Nothing would change qualitatively in our benchmark analysis of Sections
3.1 and 3.2 if we were to specify real wages as being set in terms of a basket
consisting of both goods, instead of a subset thereof.
More realistically, one would expect !T to be a function, both on e¢ ciency
wage and bargaining position grounds, of the sharing wage in the N -sector and
the scarcity of labor available from outside the T -sector.
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!T = (!N ; LT =L)!T ; 1,2 > 0
How would such a specication a¤ect our main results regarding steady state
accumulation and growth? Once T -sector employment is an argument in the
-function, either directly or through the presence of !N , a steady state rate
of accumulation ceases to exist even in its qualied sense here.15 A long-run
stationary state exists if the total labor supply L is given. However, these
mechanisms are likely to work slowly in a low income country with large pools
of underemployment. Our benchmark steady state analysis is likely to be useful
over signicant periods of time.
Lets turn nally to the case where workers in the two sectors are perfect
substitutes so that steady state wages equalize. This case is implausible on
empirical grounds given the complementarities between human and physical
capital, and the resources involved in training workers for modern sector jobs.
If, however, wages do equalize the tendency, as long as there is signicant un-
deremployment, would be towards convergence to the sharing real wage in the
N -sector. This means that, (a) a steady state rate of accumulation would
cease to exist, and (b) raising wages in the N -sector will now hurt accumulation
over time. For the reasons stated above, this scenario is of limited interest in
low-income economies.
3.4 Bottlenecks in the N-sector
In his analysis of developing economies, Kalecki (1976) placed signicant empha-
sis on supply-side bottlenecks in the production of necessities (mainly basic
agricultural output). Other prominent structuralist economists in the Latin
American tradition echoed similar concerns in the post World War II years.16
While we do not carry out a detailed steady state analysis here, a quick in-
vestigation may be interesting. In our framework, such bottlenecks could be
incorporated by having the real exchange rate adjust instead of N -sector em-
ployment to clear the market for non-tradables in the short run. Re-distribution
towards workers in the T -sector (via an increase in the nominal wage) would
then generate excess demand for non-tradables, resulting in ination, real ap-
preciation, diversion of demand away from non-tradables, and rising T -sector
wages in terms of tradables. The trade balance will develop a decit and in-
vestment will su¤er over time. As in the case of our original framework, growth
led by wage increases in the T -sector is not a sustainable policy.
But what about re-distribution toward workers in the N -sector? Here the
analysis leads to conclusions that deviate from our original framework. Most
importantly, wage-led growth is no longer an option. Why? Just as in the
case where re-distribution is carried out in the T -sector, the result is excess
demand for non-tradables, a trade decit, and real appreciation in the short run.
15See eqs. (5), (17), and (20).
16See Baer (1967) and Boianovsky (2012) for surveys.
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The latter a¤ects investment negatively, unlike in our benchmark framework of
Section 2, where there is no appreciation in the short run.
In sum, bottlenecks in the N -sector make wage-led growth less likely re-
gardless of the sector where income redistribution originates. Thus, the option
of pursuing wage-led growth based on re-distribution in the N -sector may be
more feasible in the early stages of development, when there is considerable
underemployment, so that employment (LN ) rather than the relative price of
non-tradables adjusts in the short run.
4 Broader Implications
A major argument emerging from the last section is that re-distribution to-
ward workers may have di¤erent e¤ects depending on their sector of employ-
ment. Specically, re-distribution in the T -sector undermines long-run growth
prospects by directly reducing protability. These consequences may not follow
from re-distribution in the N -sector. Indeed, if T -sector wages are even partly
xed in terms of necessitiesor N -sector goods then investment will get an up-
ward push as long as the real exchange rate moves in an equilibrating manner,
due either to market forces or the visible hand of policy makers.
Re-distribution in the T -sector may be popular amongst a vocal constituency
(i.e., the urban workers), and it does give a boost to demand in the short run
in our framework, but the decline in investment means that the boom is un-
likely to be sustained. Several historical examples come to mind, some of them
from Latin America. For instance, Rapetti (2012) compares the rapid growth
episodes in Chile and Argentina, starting in the mid-80s and 2000s, respectively.
Both episodes followed balance of payments and nancial crises, so that there
was considerable slack in the economy in the initial phases of each episode.
Both episodes involved large initial devaluations and a policy to maintain an
undervalued real exchange rate. With similar initial conditions, the subsequent
trajectories, however, diverged over time. A factor that drove the separate tra-
jectories was the way macroeconomic policy was conducted. While Argentina
followed expansionary monetary, scal, and wage policies that meant that, as
output and employment growth accelerated, wage and price ination followed
and the real exchange rate appreciated, Chilean policy makers, by contrast,
managed to moderate wage and price ination, and were able to sustain the
expansion of output and the capital stock for a much longer period.17 Policy
makers could, of course, attempt to counter this by guiding the path of the real
exchange rate in such a way as to counter the e¤ect on protability. For exam-
ple, a central planner could employ the nominal exchange rate as an instrument
for real undervaluation in order to maintain protability over time.18 But, apart
17Also see Frenkel and Rapetti (2012) for a detailed discussion of these and other historical
episodes in Latin America.
18Razmi et al. (2012)) discuss this issue in more detail. With the level of investment and
the trade balance as two targets, policy makers require two instruments. The real exchange
rate could serve as one such instrument.
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from potentially setting o¤ a depreciation-ination-depreciation cycle, it would
also undermine the initial re-distribution.
Our analysis points to an alternative, i.e., pursuing reforms in the N -sector
that re-distribute income towards wages. Given wage indexation, this will leave
real wages (in terms of non-tradables) una¤ected in the T -sector. If relative
prices move in an equilibrating manner over time, the resulting real depreci-
ation will actually raise protability and investment. A possible historical
example may be the land reforms carried out in East Asia prior to their growth
accelerations. A vast and growing body of literature has studied the Asian
miracle economies to help understand the nature of growth in low income
settings. One feature that appears to be shared by several of these cases is the
implementation of genuine land reforms that made income distribution in the
rural areas more equitable on the eve of the initial growth takeo¤s. As Stiglitz
(1996) (p. 167) notes,19 in "Korea, Japan, and Taiwan (China), land reforms
at least partially imposed from outside were important in the initial stages
of development." Land reforms considerably weakened the landlords and, when
accompanied by other measures, prevented runaway food price ination during
the growth process.
Redistribution a¤ects demand and growth in neo-Kaleckian models because
of saving di¤erentials between functional classes. This is also true for most of
the results in the present analysis,20 but presents us with an interesting nuance
in the sense that redistribution in the N -sector raising  in the context of the
present framework may have another advantage over raising !T . The latter
has an e¤ect onN -sector wages only if there is an economically signicant saving
di¤erential, i.e., s   sw > 0. If both classes have similar saving rates, one can
see, based on the relevant expressions in the Appendix, that re-distribution in
the T -sector has no e¤ect on workers outside the T -sector (who may be the bulk
of the potential labor force). In mathematical terms, d!N=d!T = d!N=d!T = 0
when s = sw. Re-distribution in the modern sector, in other words, does
not generate income in the rural sector if the saving behavior does not di¤er
between the classes. Re-distribution in the non-tradable sector, on the other
hand, translates into a proportional increase in the income received by the bulk
of the workforce (d!N=d = !N= and d!N=d = !N= when s = sw).
Furthermore, there is no impact on the trade balance in this case. The high
worker saving rates with typically moderate trade imbalances in some East
Asian countries during their rapid growth phases suggest that this factor may
have played a signicant role.
Political economy aspects are, of course, rather important here. Redistribu-
tion in the traditional sector benets not only workers across the board, but also
capitalists, at the expense of landlords. This poses challenges if the landlords
are strong, as is likely to be the case in underdeveloped economies. Indeed,
as alluded to by the quote from Stiglitz (1996) above, reforms have often been
forced through by outsiders. Similarly, between urban and rural workers, the
19See also Wade (1990) for Taiwan and Amsden (1989) for South Korea.
20A look at the Appendix helps quickly distinguish the results which get annulled when
s = sw from the ones that do not.
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former are likely to be better organized and more vocal. Direct re-distribution
in the modern sector may, therefore, be politically more appealing. In our
framework, this helps both landlords and workers in the short run, although
steady state growth is negatively a¤ected. This may be one of the many in-
stances where political factors push policy in directions that would leave almost
everyone worse-o¤ in the long run.
5 Concluding Remarks
Low income countries have characteristics which encourage us to re-visit the
standard neo-Kaleckian framework and the associated debate pertaining to
wage- versus prot-led growth. This paper is an e¤ort in that direction. Many
low-income countries have dual economies with contrasting sectoral character-
istics. The results of income re-distribution can be quite di¤erent depend-
ing on whether it takes place in the traditional/rural/non-tradable sector or
the modern/capital-intensive/tradable one. Policies that induce rapid wage in-
creases in the tradable sector may, for example, quickly undermine long-run
growth prospects. In our framework this does not occur through the tradi-
tional mechanism as developed by Blecker (1989) and others. Rather, the fact
that our low-income economy is a price-taker in international markets means
that, other things held constant, higher wages in the tradable sector undermine
protability. With full utilization of capital, this decline in protability trans-
lates into lower investment. Longer term steady state accumulation su¤ers.
The absence of wage-led growth originating from re-distribution in the trad-
able sector does not render re-distribution universally harmful during early
phases of growth. Other avenues exist and may have played a role in important
historical instances, such as the successful growth episodes experienced by sev-
eral East and South East Asian economies. Raising the share of income going to
workers in the non-tradable sector can raise steady state accumulation, in addi-
tion to generating employment through the demand channel. The increase in
steady state investment results from the real depreciation induced by the excess
domestic demand for tradables (i.e., trade decits). This of course requires that
either the adjustment mechanism whereby relative prices change in response to
trade decits occurs smoothly, or in the absence of smooth adjustment, policy
makers step in to ensure adjustment in the required direction. Given existing
evidence, complementary monetary, scal, and national saving policies are likely
to be required to guide the trajectories of the real exchange rate and external
imbalances. Indeed, the evidence suggests that governments often employ these
instruments, with varying degrees of success, to inuence exchange rates.21 The
case for re-distribution in the N -sector is weakened if lack of exchange rate ad-
21See, for example, the fear of oating literature inspired by Calvo and Reinhart (2002),
who show that, in the aftermath of the Asian crises, developing countries have systemati-
cally intervened in the foreign exchange market to manage the behavior of exchange rates.
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2007) nd that such interventions have aimed to maintain
competitive exchange rates or to avoid overvaluations.
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justment in the face of external imbalances hinders growth, as has been the
case in several developing countries that experienced stop-and-go cycles during
which foreign exchange shortages typically led to abrupt downturns instead of
smooth exchange rate depreciations.
Several caveats apply here some of which such as the possibilities of disrup-
tive adjustment to external balances and rapidly rising tradable sector wages
in response to improving fallback positions we have already discussed. The
case for re-distribution in the rural sector is stronger in the initial phases of
development when underemployment is signicant. As the pool of these work-
ers shrinks with expansion of the modern sector, prices rather than quantities
are likely to respond to excess demand in the short-run. The resulting real
appreciation could neutralize any boost to investment in the modern sector.
Section 4 briey discussed this mechanism in the context of Latin American
economies. We have not explicitly considered the role of government spending
and taxation. Also, we have ignored the role of technological change, learning
externalities, and economies of scale. To the extent that these latter factors are
present to a greater degree in the tradable sector, their incorporation amplies
concerns about the negative impact of re-distribution in that sector on invest-
ment. Productivity change in early stages of development largely results from
moving workers from low productivity traditional sectors to high productivity
modern ones. Our analysis of changes in the steady state rate of investment
suggests, therefore, that we may be capturing important elements of economic
evolution. Our focus, in any event, is the scope for wage-led growth rather
than technological change. Nevertheless, the analysis here is intentionally par-
tial and incomplete, and future empirical work should explore the robustness of
the case made in favor of the limited applicability of the traditional wage-led
growth argument to developing countries.
6 Mathematical Appendix
This section presents detailed expressions for the comparative static results dis-
cussed in Section 2 of the main text.
First some notation to avoid clutter. Let B = 1  s and S = s   sw. The
consequences of various shocks on the short-run equilibrium values of the key
endogenous variables are as follows:
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